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THE BEGINNINGS OF COMMERCIAL AGRICULTURE IN IRAN* 
Vahid F. Nowshirvani 
with the Assistance of 
Alice Knight 
Introduction 
For Iran, the nineteenth century, particularly its second half, is 
usually thought of as a period of economic stagnation, if not decline. 
The growing political and economic domination of Iran by Britain and 
Russia and the weak, corrupt and increasingly exploitative Qajar rule, 
which could not effectively resist foreign demands, are generally considered 
1the basic causes of this stagnation. In contrast to this period, the years 
after the coup d'etat of 1921, when the relatively strong central government 
embarked on a series of administrative, legal and economic reforms, are 
viewed as the beginning of the modern economic development of Iran. In this 
essay we shall try to show that the break between the two periods is not as 
sharp as generally believed and that the ability of the central government 
to carry out its refonns was based upon fundamental economic transformations 
that had been occurring in Iran as the result of the West's economic penetra-
2tion of the country. The main thesis of the paper is that between the 
ascension of Nasir-al-Din Shah to the throne (1848) and the constitutional 
revolution (1906-1911), the pre-mercantile and fragmented economy of Iran 
gradually became integrated not only into the international economy but also 
3internally. Since these developments took place under the commercial impact 
of the industrial powers, the internal integration did not mean a parallel 
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expansion in both industry and agriculture. On the contrary, competition 
from Western manufactured goods ruined much of the domestic industry. By 
the end of the period, Iran was still very much a pre-capitalist so~iety, 
but it exhibited many of the characteristics of a market economy. Since the 
expansion of Iran's exports was chiefly in agricultural products, the spread 
of commercialization was probably most conspicuous in the rural areas. Thus 
it was in an economy with a relatively advanced state of commercial exchange, 
implying considerable regional specialization and interdependence, that the 
government after the coup was able to establish a reasonably efficient central 
bureaucracy and army to carry out its reforms. 
This paper is primarily about the structural changes that took place 
in the rural areas, such as the rise of cash crops, the relative loss of 
economic autonomy of villages, changes in the pattern of land ownership and 
the creation of wage labor. However, in order to appreciate these develop­
ments, it is essential to set them in the wider context of the overall economic 
change in the country. In particular, it is useful to clear up certain mis­
conceptions responsible for the common belief in the economic stagnation and 
decline of Iran during the nineteenth century. In the first section of the 
paper, therefore, we re-examine the arguments and evidence purporting to 
show the general deterioration in economic conditions. Th·e second part is 
more specifically devoted to a description of the structural transformation 
of the rural areas and the expansion of a market economy in Iran. A brief 
concluding section discusses the implications of these developments for the 
reforms instituted after 1921. In the Appendix, we outline a few of the 
problems met encountered in sources when writing on the economic history of Iran. 
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I 
It is generally maintained that the economic disintegration of Iran in 
the second half of the nineteenth century is reflected in its chronic excess 
of imports over exports and the resulting difficulties with balance of 
payments, a constantly depreciating currency, the rising level of prices and 
- the unfavorable movements in terms of trade (the relative price of a nation's 
exports and imports). Large sections of the population, particularly the 
. 1 4peasantry, it is argued, were adversely affected by these deve opments. 
Although the various economic ills of the country are usually blamed 
on the incompetence and avarice of the ruling class, the rulers should not 
be held responsible for all these misfortunes; certainly, such factors as 
the adverse movements in terms of trade or the currency depreciation due to 
the fall in the international price of silver were beyond their control. Nor 
is it obvious that the burden of inflation (even if it can be shown that there 
was much price increase) was borne directly by the mass of the population. 
The vast majority of the poorer segments of the population were peasants 
living in relatively self-sufficient villages and, therefore, immune to 
the evils of inflation. Because land taxes were fixed in money teI111s and 
because the peasantry did not possess significant monetary assets and were 
in fact net debtors, they might even have benefitted from inflation when 
price increases eroded the real value of their liabilities. We do not wish 
to assert that Qajar rule was not oppressive and arbitrary nor that the 
government always pursued economic policies beneficial to the country. 
Neither do we believe that the common man enjoyed an adequate standard of 
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living. Rather, our aim in this section of the paper is to scrutinize 
the evidence to see if it is reliable and to determine whether the usual 
inferences logically follow. 
For many, the most obvious indication of the economic bankruptcy of Iran 
is the imbalance in its foreign trade. Contemporary observers consistently 
estimate imports to exceed exports and claim that the difference was covered 
partly by the export of specie. 5 The outflow of precious metals was cer-
tainly considered an evil, detrimental to industry, trade and the prosperity 
of the country. Iranian governments often imposed bans on the export of 
gold and even prohibited the outflow of silver coins at times when it was 
necessary to reduce the volume of Iran's imports, such as during the period 
of the sudden decline in silk output. 6 Of course, it is hard to imagine how 
such regulations could be effectively enforced. The magnitude of the foreign 
trade deficit of Iran is difficult to establish, and it is harder yet to 
measure the extent, or even the direc.tion, of the movement of specie. Until 
the end of the nineteenth century, when Belgian officials were put in charge 
of the customs administration, data on the visible trade of Iran are scanty 
and unreliable--the earlier practice of farming out the customs revenue was 
7not, for obvious reasons, conducive to accurate reporting. Other evidence 
suggests that, whether or not the commodity trade was unbalanced, the deficit 
must have been covered by transactions other than the outflow of gold and 
silver. In order to remit Iranian silver currency to pay for imports of 
goods, such direct transfers had to be cheaper than carrying out payments 
through the purchase of sterling bills of exchange on London. Taking the 
period of 1863 to 1921, we find that in only eight years was the intrinsic 
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value of the Kran, that is, the gold value of its silver content, above its 
Pound Sterling exchange rate. Only in those years would it have been profit­
able to export specie to purchase Pounds in London. When one considers the 
higher cost of movements of metal than the charges for payments through bills 
of exchange, it is not clear that there would have been large net outward 
movements of Iranian silver currency even in those eight years. 8 (Normally 
it would have been cheaper to use the silver Kran in Iran to buy bills of 
exchange on London or other financial centers.) To encounter no net outflow 
of specie is not surprising for the years after 1890, when foreign investments, 
loans to the government, remittances of Iranian workers in Russia and foreign 
military expenditures in Iran were financing the trade deficit. We are led, 
however, to conclude that, since in the earlier years Iran did not have sub­
stantial net invisible exports or capital inflow, the trade imbalance must 
have been smaller than is commonly believed. 9 
The most reasonable explanation, corroborated by contemporary observers, 
is that Iran's imports were overstated and its exports were underestimated. 
The main factor in the over-assessment of imports was the estimation of their 
value according to merchants' prices rather than by what the importers had in 
10fact paid. Importers had little incentive to undervalue their goods in 
order to lower customs dues since these were often fixed by mule loads or 
some other quantity measure rather than assessed according to the five percent 
ad valorem rate. Under-reporting of exports was widespread, and its extent 
probably considerable. The prevalence of smuggling is the most obvious 
explanation for the unreliability of export figures. Lucrative opportunities 
existed for smuggling subsidized Russian products back into Russia. There 
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was also periodically large illicit trade in foodstuffs, especially grains, 
whose export was often banned after mid-century whenever there were food 
11shortages. Another possible cause of·the underestimation of exports may 
be the failure to include transport costs to the border in the value of goods. 
Since these costs could be quite high, especially prior to the 1890's, a 
downward bias might have been introduced in the data. 
Even if substantial quantities of specie were not being exported, 
during much of this period there was undeniably, as J • Rabino puts it, 11 a 
12permanent dearth of currency." Despite Rabino 's claim, it is improbable 
that the scarcity was caused by hoarding. Chronic public deficits did not 
allow the government to save any money out of its revenue. Nor was the 
Iranian ruling class known for its frugal ways. The only people in possession 
of liquid funds were the merchants, and they were unlikely to leave their 
money idle. A more plausible explanation is that the acutely felt shortage 
was the reflection of the growing need for widely accepted instruments of 
payments to finance the _expansion of trade (which we shall discuss more 
fully below). Not only were the number and volume of commercial transactions 
growing, but they were increasingly directed to the national and the inter­
national markets. Demand for money was rising, and local credit arrangements 
to facilitate internal trade did develop to some extent, even in the absence 
of a central monetary authority. Until the Imperial Bank of Persia was 
established, the scope of such credit and clearing arrangements was limited, 
and except in a few cases such as that of Haji Amin-0-Zarb, the bills of 
Iranian merchants and aoneylenders were not widely acceptable or readily 
negotiable. Inevitably in such a situation, part of the larger demand for 
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money had to be met from increased circulation of the silver currency of 
the country. Therefore, the perceived scarcity must have been relative to 
the growing need of the expanding trade of the country, rather than a con­
sequence of a constant outward drain of specie. At times, statements about 
shortages of silver currency and the unavailability of good bills on Europe 
13reflected Iran's real periodic difficulties in paying for her imports. 
Recurrent complaints were to be expected and were evidence of the equili­
brating mechanism for balancing and foreign trade of the country, which was 
highly sensitive to such natural factors as the state of the harvest or the 
occurrence of famines and epidemics. Transfers of specie set in motion com­
pensating forces to adjust temporary trade imbalances--it was the gold standard 
in its pure form at work. 
Numerous authors have argued that the depreciation of the Iranian 
currency--that is, the declining gold or Pound Sterling value of the Kran--
14was due either to balance of payments deficits or currence debasement. 
It is true that between 1848 and 1914, the Kran fell from 22.5 kran per 
Pound Sterling to about 56 kran per Pound Sterling. 15 Prior to this period, 
debasement had been the major cause of the declining value of the Kran; yet, 
there was only one minor reduction in the official silver content of the Kran 
during these years. Clearly, the government had no incentive to debase the 
currency, since ultimately, devaluation would only hurt its own finances be­
cause of the fixed monetary value of taxes. As one would expect, cheating 
did occur in the provincial mints, but because such tampering was generally 
considered harmful to national coonnerce, minting was centralized in 1877 to 
17 
ensure a uniform currency. As we have already noted, no less an authority 
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on the Iranian currency than J. Rabino shows that the Kran often connnanded 
a premium, selling at a rate above that which the gold equivalent of its 
18
official silver content would justify. This is hardly to be expected from 
a currency that was constantly being debased. Needless to say, the officials 
of the British-owned Imperial Bank of Persia had a vested interest in blaming 
Iranian authorities for the alleged irregularities in the administration of 
19
the monetary system. Since Iran was in effect on the silver standard, 
the exchange value of its currency was simply determined by the international 
price of s·ilver. Depreciation, then, had nothing to do with debasement, the 
commercial and financial policies of the government, or the alleged trade 
deficit of the country. The decline in the exchange rate of the Kran in 
terms of Pound Sterling, since the latter was tied to gold, was the natural 
consequence of the falling international price of silver, especially after 
the 1880 's. 
Whatever its cause, the depreciation of the currency, it is maintained 
"constituted a severe and indirect tax that hit the poor particularly •••• 
1120 
The mechanism by which the depreciation affected the peasants is not clearly 
specified, but it was supposedly inflation, which was not matched by an 
equal increase in wage. 
21 Inflation, which was to some extent caused by the 
declining exchange rate, could not per se be responsible for the deterioration 
in the standard of living of the poor. If wages did not rise as much as 
the general level of prices, the cause must be sought in factors other than 
22
the falling value of the Kran. The mass of the population, which was 
primarily rural, even at the end of the century, might have been adversely 
affected by price changes insofar as the terms of trade moved against them. 
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McDaniel and Issawi, both citing the fall in the world prices of agricultural 
products from 1873 to the mid-1890's, have claimed such a reduction in the 
23real income of the general population, especially the peasantry. Whether 
in fact the terms of trade became unfavorable for Iran is a debatable issue 
which we shall ex.amine more fully below. Our earlier discussion of the causes 
of exchange rate devaluation has shown that, whatever change there might have 
been in the relative prices of agricultural to industrial goods, it was un­
related to currency depreciation. 
When considering the measurement of the rate of inflation and of the 
deterioration in living conditions, it is necessary to recall that evidence 
concerning price changes in Iran is scanty and highly unreliable. Given the 
fragmented structure of the economy, the use of isolated price data, seen in 
McDaniel, to show any general movements in prices, is of doubtful validity. 
Not only were there large seasonal and regional price differences, especially 
for bulky commodities such as grains, but the history of the period is 
characterized by wide price fluctuations due to natural or economic factors. 
As late as 1890, regional price differences of over 300 percent were not 
24 unconnnon for grain. In 1910, bread and grain in Mashad fluctuated by over 
2550 percent between summer and winter. Napier reports that during the 1871-
1872 famine, grain was selling at 4 Krans/man in Shirvan, while at the time 
of his visit (1874), it had fallen to 5 man/Krans, one-twentieth of its 
26previous price. Nevertheless, it appears that in the 1890's and the early 
years of the twentieth century, domestic prices and wages were generally 
higher. We doubt, however, that these changes can be measured, even roughly, 
by an index to determine whether prices rose significantly more than wages. 27 
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Statements concerning declining real wages are not, therefore, based on 
even remotely objective measures but upon comparisons between travellers' 
accounts from the early nineteenth century and those of the late nineteenth 
28and early twentieth centuries. The validity of such conclusions is highly 
questionable because of the doubtful impartiality of such descriptions and, 
more importantly, because of the systematic biases which must have tainted 
the vantage point of the later observers as the difference between European 
29
and Iranian living standards widened over the course of the century. 
Clearly, though, our evidence does not allow us to reach the opposite con­
clusion that there was an improvement in the welfare of the masses, who, even 
lllltil much later, lived in miserable conditions. In the second section of 
the paper, we do show that the availability of certain simple articles of 
consumption was more widespread than is sometimes maintained. 
Arriving at a judgement about the impact of changes in the terms of 
trade upon the well-being of the population is not a less complex task. 
Firstly, the decline in world prices of primary products relative to prices 
30
of manufactured goods is not an unequivocally established fact. Secondly, 
it is not clear that the relative price of primary to industrial goods, 
usually measured by the. relative price of United Kingdom exports to exports, 
is the appropriate terms of trade for Iran. Iran's imports of agricultural 
produce consisted of specialty goods such as opium, dried fruits, silk and 
gums, in addition to the staples, cotton, grain and wool. Changes in the 
prices of some of these goods, notably opium and silk, do not appear to 
follow closely the general trend in agricultural prices. In the absence of 
continuous price series, we have to rely on the scattered data presented in 
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Table 1, which shows the price of opium in the city of Mashad. (For the 
sake of a consistent comparison, we have not included the data for other 
years which were available only for other locations.) 
Table 1 
Price of Opium Per Shah Man in Mashad, in Pound Sterling 
YE AR S 
1870 1883 1889 1890 1901 1902 1903 1904 1905 
6.0 4.6 8.0 6.5 4.3 3.3 4.0 5.0 6.7 
Source: Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, Various Diplomatic and Con­
sular Reports. 
Information on silk prices is even more difficult to obtain; hence, we have 
chosen to indicate the general trend in the price of this commodity by 
examining the export price of Chinese raw silk, which must have followed 
a similar pattern to that of Iranian silk. 
Table 2 
Average Export Price of Chinese Silk in Dollars/1000 Piculs of Raw Silk 
1870-74 1 75-'79 1 80- 1 84 '85-'89 '90~'94 1 95-'99 1900-1904 '05-'09 '10-'14 
700 470 430 400 420 560 710 800 760 
Source: D. K. Lieu, The Silk Industry of China (Shanghai: 1941). 
The conclusion we can draw from these figures is that the fall of the prices 
of silk and opium was not as substantial as the general decline in agricultural 
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prices and that by the beginning of the twentieth century, when they were 
both important export items, their prices had recovered to levels equal to 
or even higher than those prevailing in the pre-depression era. The situation 
is not surprising since the fall in the prices of agricultural staples was 
partly caused by the expansion of cultivation in the thinly populated "New 
World," which was not suited to the production of such labor-intensive crops. 
Finally, Iran itself was a large importer of agricultural products such 
as tea and sugar and would have benefitted, as far as these items were con­
cerned, from a fall in agricultural prices. In the following table we attempt 
to show the magnitude of the price movement for the three largest imports of 
Iran. Although these are not the prices that prevailed in Iran, the latter 
must have exhibited similar trends. The table certainly demonstrates sig­
nificant declines in the prices of Iran's principal imports. The existence 
and size of such declines may invalidate statements regarding unfavorable 
movements in the terms of trade of the country. The verification of such 
assertions must await the construction of a systematic index of the terms of 
trade for Iran, which would be outside the scope of the present paper. 
Closely related to the issues of terms of trade, price fluctuations 
and currency depreciation is the change in the volume of the external trade 
of the country. Our interest in measuring the expansion of trade stems from 
its direct relevance to the spread of commercialization, the focus of the 
second section of this study. Since actual quantity data are seldom avail­
able, there has been a tendency to measure mo~ements in the volume of trade 
in terms of some foreign exchange and indirectly, then, in terms of gold. 
Using such a standard, Entner has shown that Russo-Persian trade surpassed 
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Table 3 
Prices of Major Imports of Iran 
Textiles and 
Tea sugar Fibers 31 
Aver age Indian Average wholesale Board of Trade 
Years 
Export Price in 
Pound Sterling/lb. 





1870-74 .088 23.60 156.40* 
1875-79 .091 21. 00 134. 96 
1880-84 .070 18.80 150.05 
1885-89 .049 13.30 103.56 
1890-94 .052 13.10 97.48 
1895-99 .052 9,80 85.38 
1900-04 .031 9.30 100.04 
1905-09 • 028 9. 80 93,68 
1910-15 .032 11.15 127. 7 
*Average for the years 1871-74. 
Source: B. R. Mitchell, Abstract of British Historical Statistics 
(Cambridge: 1962); N. Deerr, The History of Sugar (London: 
1949); Great Britain, Board of Trade, Statistical Abstract 
for the Several Colonial and Other Possessions of the United 
Kingdom (London: 1865-1905), later called Statistical Abstract 
for the British Self-Governing Dominions, Colonies, Possessions 
and Protectorates (London: 1904-1918), various volumes. 
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its 1830 level only after 1880, and thus argues that the Treaty of Turka-
32manchai was not effective in promoting trade between the two nations. 
The decline in Russo-Persian trade during the 1830 1 s can easily be explained 
by the plague epidemic of 1830-1831, which, it is claimed, killed about one­
third to one-half of the population of the Caspian region. The real volume 
of trade must have exceeded its 1830 level long before 1880, and contentions 
to the contrary reflect the mistaken view that gold value of trade somehow 
estimates the quantity of trade, whereas it is merely an alternative measure 
of its value. Since prices were generally falling between 1830 and 1880, the 
gold value of the level of trade underestimates the real growth in the quantity 
of trade during this period; moreover, the biases introduced by the use of 
value of trade in terms of gold are not confined to the years 1830 to 1880. 
The declining trend of prices continued until about 1895 and reversed itself 
33for the two decades following that year. The usual measures of the level 
of trade are, therefore, likely to underestimate expansion of voltune of trade 
in the last two decades of the century and to exaggerate its increase after 
1895. 
Professor Issawi has attempted to measure the growth in the quantum 
of trade using, in the absence of more suitable data, price deflators of 
British exports and imports; according to his evaluation, between the 1850's 
34and 1914, the real volume of trade quadrupled. This procedure, rather 
than Entner's method, is the correct way to assess the change in the quantity 
index of trade. Still, we suspect that Professor Issawi's estimate may be 
too low. Two factors we have already mentioned are probably the main causes 
of the downward bias in the figures. One is the relative importance of 
agricultural goods in Iran's imports, and the decline in their index was 
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larger than that of general British exports. Second, the rise in smuggling 
relative to the total trade grew with the government's increasing tendency 
to impose embargos on the exports of foodstuffs. Our position concerning 
the existence of such biases in Professor Issawi's estimates involves con­
jecture, and we do not believe that it would be possible to construct a 
reasonably exact quantity index of trade to measure the changes with greater 
precision. 
From the discussions in this section, it should be clear that a number 
of the conmon explanations of the stagnation and decay of the Iranian economy 
are based on erroneous analysis, while other draw upon evidence which is, at 
best, ambiguous. As we have emphasized, we do not subscribe to the view that 
in the second half of the nineteenth century Iran enjoyed a period of dynamic 
growth--a position which would be patently false. Others might consider the 
changes we describe and analyze in the following section as the symptoms of 
Iran's increasing economic dependence on the West rather than of economic 
progress. Yet, whether these structural modifications could be considered 
as capitalist development will not be our primary concern. Still, it is 
unreasonable to describe these changes as retrogressions or to argue that 
the circumstances surrounding their occurrence were those of general decline. 
These transformations did gradually enable the State to take a more active 
part in the formulation of economic policies. 
II 
A number of social and economic historians of Iran have at tempted to 
divide Iranian history into periods and to analyze its developments in terms 
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of such historical stages and categories as feudalism or the Asiatic mode 
35of production and oriental despotism. Without joining the controversy 
over historical periodization in Iran, we would argue that whether or not 
Qajar Iran may be classified as feudal or Asiatic or some variation thereof, 
it is useful to think of it as a pre~mercantile society which was gradually 
transformed into a market economy. We are primarily concerned with the 
extension of commodity exchange relations and how this development modified 
the existing economic and social structure. We are aware that the course 
of such structural transformations is partly determined by the characteristics 
of the society in which they occur. As Marx maintained, 
Commerce, therefore, has a more or less dissolving 
influence everywhere on the producing organization, 
which it finds at hand and whose different forms are 
mainly carried on with a view of use value. To what 
extent it brings about the dissolution of the old mode 
of production depends on its solidarity and internal 
structure. And whither this process of dissolution will 
lead, in other words, what new mode of production will 
replace the old, does not depend on commerce, but on 
the character of the old mode of production itself.36 
An understanding of the pre-existing structure, is therefore, essential for 
a complete analysis of the development that occurred in Iran--hence, the 
relevance and importance of the historical controversy mentioned above. 
However, the pace of the spread of markets, the reaction of the various 
segments of the society to changes in their traditional roles and the 
emergence of some specific forms rather than others, all issues central 
to the debate, will not be our concern here. The remainder of this paper 
is confined to a description of the nature and the extent of the expansion 
of commercial relations in Iran, especially in its rural areas. 
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Perhaps the concept of non-market or pre-mercantile society needs some 
explanation. In a non-market economy, in its pure form, economic organiza­
tion, the social division of labor and the exchange of products and services 
is based upon cuatom and/or command by a central authority. Historically, 
such systems exhibited several salient common traits: for example, produc­
tion was for use value, irrespective of whether or not each producer was the 
ultimate consumer of the product, and economic surplus was extracted directly 
either in the fonn of goods or various types of labor services. In the absence 
of cheap transportation and communication, regional specialization was limited, 
and in general a close correspondence existed between each region's production 
and its consumption. Because of the restricted sphere of exchange, institu­
tions to facilitate trade were poorly developed. 
In contrast, production in a market economy is for exchange rather than 
for the immediate use of the producer; surplus extraction is indirect through 
cash rents or taxes, and considerable regional specialization occurs, neces­
sitating trade betw~en regions. Relatively large movements of goods allow 
the concentration of the economic surplus, which can be used to maintain an 
efficient central bureaucracy and anny. The prevalence of commodity exchange 
requires elaborate legal and economic institutions concerning property rights, 
enforcement of contracts, a widely accepted medium of exchange, and, even­
tually, negotiable credit instruments. Clearly, this summary offers only 
a highly abstract and simplified framework to analyze even a limited sphere 
of economic activity. We shall elaborate on these concepts and discuss the 
complexities that may occur in any actual situation in the context of the 
description of the historical structural change in Iran that follows. The 
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theoretical categorie~ above are not definitely dichotomous, and no sharp 
line~ divide these two types of economic organization. As a pre-mercantile 
economy is transfonned into a market economy, the dominant institutions and 
structure of the former are gradually replaced by those characterizing the 
latter. 37 
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, Iran, especially in the 
rural areas, exhibited many of the dominant characteristics of a pre­
mercantile economy. Of course, during the Safavid rule, the country had 
enjoyed considerable amounts of internal exchange and trade, but the political 
and military events of the second half of the eighteenth century had left the 
economy in a fragmented state. The salient features of the economic struc­
ture of the country may be sunmarized as follows. The population was largely 
rural, and nomadic tribes constituted about one-half of the total. The degree 
of self-sufficiency of the peasant and nomadic communities is suggested by 
the small share of agricultural products in the export trade as compared to 
their dominant role later in the nineteenth century. Iran exported raw and 
manufactured silk, cotton cloth, spices, dyes, drugs, pearls, wheat, skins 
and livestock. In return, it imported velvets, woolen and cotton cloth, 
spices, dyes, metals, watches and clocks, brocades, lace and gold thread, 
guns and gunpowder, glassware and mirrors. 
Three aspects of the pattern of the foreign trade of Iran are noteworthy 
as indications of the fragmented state of the economy. Firstly, even though 
precise figures are not available, the volume of luxury articles for the 
consumption of the wealthy seems to have been substantial; exchange was not 
yet undertaken to satisfy the needs of the general population. Secondly, 
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such traditional items of long-distance trade as spices, dyes and drugs, 
which usually are the first products exchanged among regions irrespective 
of the degree of division of labour and development of markets within each 
area, figured prominently in the external comnerce of the country. Thirdly, 
a sizable part of Iran's imports was ultimately for re-export to other 
countries, primarily Afghanistan and the Ottoman Empire, which at this time 
were its main trading partners. The location of the country on a trading 
route, rather than its own internal economic structure, partly determined 
the volume of its foreign dealings. 
The low level of integration of the internal markets is also suggested 
by the lack of an adequate monetary system, Though there was supposedly 
a uniform metallic currency, minting was farmed out and decentralized; 
during the reign of Fath'Ali Shah, for example, the silver Kran was minted 
in thirty-one localities. Such a system obviously lent itself to abuse and 
resulted in disparities between coins minted in different cities, A wide 
variety of foreign coins circulated mostly in border cities and areas, but 
such coins were probably not generally acceptable other than by merchants 
. hf . 38connected wit oreign commerce. 
Despite several attempts at reform, fiscal administration remained 
basically unchanged until the constitutional revolution, providing further 
evidence of the limited sphere of market exchange in Iran. The existence 
of tax farming, the prevalence of taxes in kind, either in produce or in 
provision of military service, and the widespread use of Tuyuls (the assign-
ments of the taxes of a particular village or area to individuals in return 
for services rendered or simply as gifts bestowed upon favorites of the 
-20-
court. ) 39 point to an economic structure divided into many independent units. 
The inability of the central government to maintain a reasonably efficient 
bureaucracy or a regular army paid from its general revenue was the result of 
its incapacity to concentrate and centralize revenue collection. A large 
portion of the tax revenue of each province was used to defray local expendi­
ture. A relatively small part of what remained was actually remitted to the 
capital and thus actually passed through the central treasury. Expenses in­
curred by the central government were often paid for by drafts (barats) on the 
arevenue of various provinces. Such government bills often sold at large 
discount not only because of costs involved in collecting such claims but 
also because of the uncertainty of their acceptance by provincial governors 
who might have at times felt in a position to defy the authority of the central 
admini-government. 
40 Centrifugal forces stemming from the relative economic, 
cen­strative and military independence of each region resisted attempts at 
tralizing reforms; only the existence of factional rivalries in each region 
enabled the government to assert some limited authority arid to prevent even 
41
further disintegration. 
The extremely complex land tenure system, closely related to the land 
revenue administration, was also a distinct manifestation of the undeveloped 
state of commercial relations and markets. Complicated and diverse systems 
for division of agricultural products prevailed. Sharecropping, which has 
not totally disappeared even today, was not simply a matter of apportioning 
the output between the landlord and tenant but involved claims by people 
who provided community services as, for instance, bath attendants or village 
and by others who held certain offices like village guard (dashtban),craftsmen, 
I 
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village headman (kadkhuda) and mullah. 42 Resort to such direct methods of 
payment as immediate division of crops rather than monetary renumeration 
was the natural consequence of a limited system of market exchange. In 
addition to a share in the harvest, landlords exacted from the peasantry 
extensive personal services which varied substantially according to local 
43customs. 
The complexity of the system, direct expropriation of the surplus and 
the not-infrequent resort to coercion required local presence of landlords; 
therefore, they had to reside near their property. Absentee landholders 
were not unknown-especially among very powerful members of the ruling class 
who often acquired their property through the exercise of influence while 
44holding political office or through the grants of tuyuls. Bailiffs 
(mobashers) were appointed to gather the revenue, but controlling these 
overseers themselves was not easy. The consumption of surplus had to occur 
largely in or near the locality where it was produced. 
Despite our emphasis on the rudimentary state of market exchange in 
Iranian society, it must be admitted that the concept of private property 
and procedures for enforcement of contracts were well developed, at least 
theoretically, within the tradition of Islamic jurisprudence. In particular, 
the institution of private property in land was widespread, although property 
rights were not absolute nor always very secure. The inadequacy of the land 
registration system, possibilities for forgery of documents, and the arbitrary 
nature of political power were responsible for this instability. 45 Nonethe­
less, land transactions were known and landed property could be used as 
collateral on loans. Abbas Mirza makes several references in his will to 
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various villages he had purchased, and land deals involving sales to 
members of both the merchant and ruling classes can be cited. 46 However, 
these transactions could not have been widespread since the lack of liquidity 
would have limited large purchases of this sort. Merchants, almost the only 
people in possession of liquid funds, were unlikely to invest a significant 
portion of their assets in agricultural land. As long as the means of commu­
nication remained primitive, they had to buy land in the vicinity of their 
place of residence. Geographical proximity was essential not only for the 
assessment of the value of the land but also for its continued and profitable 
exploitation. In a situation where the surplus from the land was in the form 
of an elaborate division of the crops and a maze of personal services, 
reasonable evaluation of the real worth of any property would have been 
47difficult except for those who had an intimate knowledge of local customs. 
Early in the century, then, the merchant class still probably favored invest­
ment in urban real estate. 
This brief description of the main features of the economic structure 
of Iran oversimplifies a complex reality. No doubt vast regional differences 
existed with regard to such matters as natural resources,' accessibility to 
major trade routes, the extent of division of labor, the degree of commer­
cialization, the land revenue system, and specific achniniStrative, legal 
and political institutions. This caveat notwithstanding, we think it useful 
to go beyond heterogeneity to emphasize the common features of the regions 
because our main aim (in the discussion that follows) is to stress the 
similarities in the pattern of transformation that occurred after mid-century. 
Although the direction of change in each region was such as to integrate it 
into a more unified system, many local differences did not necessarily 
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diminish and were even accentuated; indeed, regional disparities in the 
standard of living were probably less marked than they subsequently became. 
When interregional exchange was limited, the economic structures of the 
various provinces were alike because each region had to provide for a large 
part of its own needs. Consequently, the cropping pattern within each area 
was more diversified than we observe later, and there was wider geographical 
distribution of production manufacturing. 
The reign of Nasir-Ad-Din Shah may be viewed as a period during which 
the structure of the economy, especially in the rural sector, was fundamentally 
altered. The pace of change accelerated in the last decades of the nineteenth 
century and the early years of the present century until it came to a tem­
porary halt beeause of political disruptions caused by the constitutional 
revolution, the First World War and the military occupation of parts of the 
country by foreign forces, both prior to and during the War. Over the 60-year 
period between 1850 and 1910, the dominant economic characteristics of Iran 
became those of a market economy, and the features of the pre-mercantile era 
began to disappear. Much of this transformation occurred under the impact of 
the economic expansion of the industrial countries, often at their initiative 
and urged on by their political pressure, rather than through a process of 
internal development. As a result the rural sector became integrated into· 
a network of internal and international trade, while the urban areas became 
more and more centers of commerce and administration as their manufacturing 
activities were partly ruined through competition from cheap Western indus­
trial goods. Total destruction was averted perhaps by the ability of the 
handicrafts sectors to adapt somewhat to the new conditions and to change 
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their product mix. 
Though relatively minor, demographic transition over the course of the 
nineteenth century conforms to the pattern of change which we claim occurred 
during the period. The end of the century found the population still largely 
rural but the relative size of the nomadic population had fallen as had the 
rural-urban population ratio. In 1900, about 79 percent of the population 
lived in the rural areas, a ratio which was to drop only about one further 
percentage point until 1940. The nomadic population was reduced to about one­
fourth of the total population. These ratios show a decline compared with their 
estimated value, 90 percent and one-half, respectively, for the beginning of 
48the century. Both of these developments indicate growing internal ex-
change, independent of the increased trade generated between rural and urban 
areas because of the expansion of foreign commerce, for the settled rural 
population was probably less self-sufficient than the nomadic tribes, and, 
of course, food had to be supplied for the larger urban population. Neither 
of these reasons necessarily implies commercial relations between the town 
and the countryside since other systems of exchange could have performed 
the same functions, but, as we shall try to demonstrate below, markets assumed 
an ever-increasing role. 
The rise in the foreign trade of Iran during the period roughly between 
1850 and 1914 and the problems with measuring the change in the real volume 
of trade have been dealt with in the first section of this paper. Even if 
we accept Professor Issawi's figures, which we claimed might underestimate 
the actual expansion of trade, a quadrupling of the real volume of commodity 
trade is a substantial increase. The growth of Iran's foreign trade is not 
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surprising in the light of contemporary developments; the opening up of 
the Suez Canal, the fall in Ocean freight rates, the economic growth of 
Europe and above all, the economic expansion of its northern neighbor, 
Russia, which had accelerated in the last third of the nineteenth century. 
Russia's index of industrial production had risen from the average of 13.5 
49in 1865-76 to 100 in the years 1905-1913, nearly doubling each decade. 
According to Entner, the average value of Russo-Persian trade for the same 
50period increased from 7.7 million to 69.1 million gold rubles. Because of 
Entner's standard of measurement and the pattern of international price 
movements, which we have discussed, the growth of trade was more gradual 
than suggested by Entner, who attributes much of the increase to the period 
after 1885. Whatever the actual pattern of expansion within the period, it 
is undeniable that between the mid-nineteenth century and the beginning of 
the First World War, Russo-Persian commodity trade increased at a more rapid 
rate than that of the total volume of the foreign trade of Iran. By the end 
of the period, Russia was by far the largest trading partner of Iran with a 
commerce valued at nearly three times that of her nearest rival, Great 
51Britain. 
The growth of the volume of trade during the last half of the century 
is prima facie evidence of increasing commercialization, but more significant 
was the change in the character of trade and its commodity composition. 
When Russia and Great Britain replaced Afghanistan and the Ottoman Empire 
as the main trading partners of Iran, transit trade through Iran, though 
still of considerable value, declined relative to the nation's total foreign 
commerce. Neglecting this change in the nature of external trade while 
-26-
considering merely its total volume results in underrating the real impact 
of the expansion of foreign transactions on the economic structure. Clearly, r 
since an increasing portion of external trade was destined for exchange 
within the country, the internal spread of conunercial relations was greater 
than aggregate figures would suggest. 
With the change in the final destination of trade, the commodity com­
position was substantially altered. Exports and re-exports of manufactured 
goods declined relative to those of agricultural staples. In a typical year 
at the beginning of the twentieth century (1903-1904), the seven major agri­
cultural commodities--namely, grains, cotton, wool, silk, opium, dried fruits 
and gums--constituted about 85 percent of Iran's exports (excluding fish), 
a figure which probably underestimates their true share due to the smuggling 
of grains. In the same year, Iran's imports were dominated by such items 
for mass consumption as cotton cloth, sugar and tea, which together made up 
about 60 percent of the volume of imports. Compared to the composition of 
trade at the beginning of the nineteenth century, these figures point to a 
fundamental structural change in the economy quite similar to the process of 
transformation occurring in most of the backward regions of the world as 
they became increasingly integrated into the international economy. 
The expansion of the volume of Iran's foreign conunerce and the modifi­
cation of its structure provide convincing evidence for the assertion that 
the impetus for the commercialization of agriculture came from without 
rather than from internal development. This point is particularly well 
illustrated by the nature of the growing Russo-Persian trade. The economic 
relation between Iran and Russia, which was itself only a semi-industrial 
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nation, was one of hinterland to center. Industrial production expanded 
in the center while the hinterland was opened up as a supplier of raw 
materials and a market for the products of the growing industries. Rus­
sian merchants played a direct role in encouraging the production of such 
52items as cotton, wool and grains destined for Russian markets. At the 
same time, the expansion of the.Russian railway network, improved naviga­
tion in the Caspian, and better roads in northern Iran (built mostly by 
Russian concessionaries) helped to integrate the two markets. Because the 
other European nations, especially Great Britain, were more advanced in­
dustrially, Russian goods, in particular textiles and sugar, could not 
initially compete effectively and had to be subsidized. Such export 
bounties were not designed merely to enable Russian textiles and sugar to 
undersell those from other industrial nations, an objective achieved as 
53Russia gradually gained a larger share of these markets in Iran. At 
times, Russia adopted subsidization for the express purpose of discouraging 
industrial production within Iran; in the most notorious incident, Russia 
temporarily exported sugar to Iran at artificially low prices to bring 
about the bankruptcy of the modern sugar mill established there in 1895. 
Until the beginnings of the twentieth century, commercial relations 
between the two countries were governed by the Treaty of Turkamanchai. 
As Russian industry matured and an infrastructure for trade developed, 
and since geographical proximity made the two countries one another's 
natural trading partners, Russia realized that the provisions of the 
treaty did not serve its best interests. In 1903 a new customstreaty 
went into effect, replacing the old ad valorem import and export tax of 
5 percent by a more complicated tariff schedule which generally favored 
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Russian goods over imports from other countries and eliminated the Iranian 
54export tax. The removal of the export tax on Iran's raw materials, 
ostensibly to increase their volumes and to redress the unfavorable 
balance of trade, clearly demonstrates the dependence of Iran's agricul­
tural exports on the Russian market. The tax in effect represented a 
monopoly rent for the Iranian government, and Russia pressed for the 
elimination of the duty as it recognized its own monopsonist position-­
the Iranian peasant was a "captive seller" who could not easily turn to 
other markets. 
The growth of trade, which, as we have argued above, was tied to 
economic expansion abroad, took place in the context of improvements in the 
infrastructure for commerce, such as the transportation and communication 
network or the economic and legal market institutions. Despite Anglo­
Russian rivalry which impeded the construction of railroads in Iran, 
part of the changes in the transportation and communication system was 
initiated and undertaken by foreign interests. Political considerations 
by Britain and Russia might have delayed the development of the network, 
but once started, competition betwE?en the two nations stimulated invest­
ment as each tried to match any advantage gained by the other. As a 
.result, the process became cumulative, the expansion of trade and infra­
structure reinforcing one another over time. 
Revolutions in the means of transport, chiefly the expansion of rail­
roads and steam shipping, which occurred outside the borders of the coun­
try, were certainly decisive factors in integrating Iran intb the world 
economic system. Within Iran, no such developments took place, although 
many fruitless attempts were made to obtain concessions to build railways. 
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The most notable change in the transport system of the country was the 
introduction of shipping in the Karun during the 1880's, and the con-
struction of a few carriageable roads, usually by foreign concessionaires, 
in the last decade of the nineteenth and the early years of the twentieth 
century. (During the First World War, the British military forces built 
some roads for motor transport.) Despite the use of carts on these roads 
which joined Teheran with the North and the southwestern trading routes, 
pack animals remained the basic means of transportation of merchandise 
(and mule tracks the main road system) until the eve of the First World 
War. Practically all commentators stress the difficulty of moving goods 
and people within the country, the time involved, the monetary cost and 
55the insecurity. No doubt, such observations were correct, for trans-
portation was expensive and risky. However, the rate and the direction 
of change rather than the absolute level of costs is the relevant factor 
to consider for our analysis of the extension of markets. Again, the 
usual problems with Iranian data, the absence of consistent long time­
series of freight rates and of a corresponding index of general level of 
prices, precludes definitive statements regarding the long-term trends in 
the real cost of transportation. We think it reasonable to maintain that 
over time such costs must have declined. The introduction of wheeled 
traffic might have been a causal factor, though not a significant one. 
A more appreciable reduction in cost probably was brought about by the 
growth in the volume of trade itself. Certainly with modern transportation 
systems, there are large economies of scale, average cost declining as the 
scale of operation grows. One might think that with the means of trans­
port employed in Iran during this period, such economies of scale were 
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negligible, but convincing arguments can be made for the existence of 
substantial returns to scale. Certain overhead costs were fixed in the 
network for the provision of the needs of the caravans, the construction 
and the upkeep of caravansarai, stocking a minimum supply of fodder and 
food, and the expenses of forwarding agents in the commercial centers. 
The rise in the volume of trade and, more importantly, the increased 
frequency of joumeys, which would have reduced waiting time, must have 
lowered the average cost. Increased security of the roads was even more 
significant in cheapening of transportation. On the more travelled routes, 
such as the Enzeli Teheran Road, banditry had practically disappeared, at 
least during normal times. The trend was general not only because the 
increased authority of the central government provided protection but 
also because larger caravans could better afford to employ a larger body 
of private guards. At times of political turmoil, freight rates would 
rise, but over the course of the period, such instability was gradually 
confined to the more remote regions of the country. 56 Thus, though the 
time required to ship goods between regions did not decline appreciably, 
there are reasonable grounds to believe that the real cost of transpor­
tation declined. (Incidentally, a factor in spreading commercialization 
into rural areas was the provision of supplies required by the growing 
traffic. A major portion of the needs of the muleteers, their food, 
forage for the animals and animals themselves, were purchased from 
fanners or nomadic tribes. Since freight rates appear to have been 
sensitive to fluctuations in the price of forage, much of the expendi­
ture of transportation must eventually have ended up in the rural sector.) 
In contrast to the absence of dramatic, visible changes in the 
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transportation system, Iran's conununications network was markedly improved 
during the second half of the nineteenth century. Although a rudimentary 
postal system was established as early as 1851, it was only in the mid-
1870's that a regular postal service was instituted, and in 1877 Iran 
joined the international Postal Union. Regular weekly services existed 
between Teheran and main Iranian cities, and a fortnightly service pro­
vided mail connection with Europe. Although the postal service, like 
other public services, was farmed out until 1901, the network expanded, 
57and the number of post offices grew from 60 in 1881 to 224 in 1918. 
The establishment of the postal system greatly reduced the time required 
to send mail and small packages between cities, demonstrated by the fol­
lowing table from Rabino (circa 1890). 
Table 4 
Days Journey Days Journey 
From Teheran to: Distance in Miles by Post by Caravan 
Tabriz 350 4 17 
Resht 200 3 10 
Meshhed 558 8 24 
Isphahan 245 4 12 
Shiraz 530 8 27 
Bushire 700 13 37 
Yezd 412 8 21 
Kerman 640 12 32 
Ramadan 200 3 9 
Kermanshah 330 5 14 
Source: J. Rabino, "Banking in Persia." 
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The original impetus for the construction of a telegraphic network 
in Iran came from the British government, which was eager to establish 
speedy communication with India. Agreements were reached in the mid-
1860's, but once the initial lines were in operation, the system expanded 
rapidly, and by the end of the century the network covered most of the 
Iranian territory in addition to serving its original function of con­
necting India with Europe. The stimulus for the fast growth came partly 
from the Iranian government's recognition of the utility of the telegraphic 
network. Therefore, it was willing to invest in and to grant concessions 
for new lines. By 1876, there were already over 4,000 kilometers of 
telegraphic lines joining 46 offices within Iran; by 1904, 9,640 kilometers 
58
connected 130 localities. 
The improvements in the communications system had far-reaching effects 
' 
on the political unification of the country, greatly enhancing the authority 
of the central government, but they also had a profound economic impact. 
Commercial exchange was expedited, and by the beginning of the present 
century, one may speak of an integrated national market in Iran. Both ·the 
postal and the telegraphic networks were used extensively for the dissemina­
tion of commercial intelligence, the transmission of purchase or sale orders, 
and the remittance of funds. 
59 The extension of the system into a region 
usually stimulated commercial activity there. Lieutenant Vaughan in his 
Report of Journey through Persia records that, "Since the introduction of 
telegraph and post office, Yezd has become an important center of trade•.. 
1160 
Merchants were, of course, very much aware of the necessity for quick 
61 -
A further factor aiding the growing commercialization of the economy 
communications and promoted the expansion of the system. 
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the reform of the monetary system. In 1877, the various provincial 
mints were abolished, and the issuance of the currency was centralized in 
was 
Teheran. More significantly, in 1889 the Imperial Bank of Persia was 
established under a concession granted to a British company and was given 
the exclusive right to issue bank notes. Soon after, a private Russian 
bank began operations, and later the Imperial Ottoman Bank opened several 
branches in Iran. The network of modern banks spread fairly rapidly, but 
though the foreign-owned banking sector provided stiff competition for the 
informal indigenous money market, it was not able to eliminate it alto­
gether. Even before the creation of the Imperial Bank, the wealthier 
merchants and moneylenders (sarrafs) had created their own financial 
instruments, and funds could be transferred between cities and even inter­
nationally with relative ease. We have already mentioned the banking 
operations of Haji Amin-0-Zarb, but other also engaged in such activities. 
Millspaugh estimated that at the time of his first missions, there were 
five Persian merchants with credit ranging from 10 to SO million Krans, 
who bought and sold bills on the provinces and whose notes were generally 
acceptable. Surely, many more had operations limited to specific regions. 
62 
Although ultimately the domination of the financial sector by foreign 
banks was detrimental to the interests of the country, competition from 
foreign banks initially aided regional commercial activity. As the notes 
of the Imperial Bank drove out of national circulation the notes of the 
Iranian sarrafs, the latter had to rechannel their capital from financing 
63 
national and international trade to providing funds for local use. 
The legal and administrative framework for the conduct of business-• 
codes and procedures for enforcement of commercial contacts and for 
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recovery of debts in bankruptcy cases--remained practically unchanged. 
Although foreign merchants, in particular Russian and British, enjoyed 
capitulatory rights and usually had the support of their consuls in pressing 
for their claims, foreigners complained frequently about dishonesty of 
Iranian merchants and agents, fraudulent bankruptcies, and the corruption 
64and complicity of Iran officials in such matters. No doubt, Iranian 
merchants were not always scrupulous in their dealings with foreigners 
or with each other, but the charges of fraud are exaggerated. Limited 
markets, frequent natural disasters, the underdeveloped state of capital 
markets, and the size of their assets made Iranian merchants vulnerable; 
most bankruptcies were indeed genuine failures and were, at times, recog­
65nized as such by foreign consuls. The difficulties in collecting debts 
reflected the lack of continuity in commercial relations rather than 
the absence of an elaborate legal and administative machinery. Even at 
present, in highly industrial and m.arket oriented economies, a company 
going out of business usually finds it hard to collect its debts. So, 
when Consul Jones complains about difficulties experienced in collecting 
rooney from the debtors of a British firm after it left Tabreez, he was 
not describing conditions peculiar to Iran. 66 As one would expect with 
the growth in the vollllne of trade, better communications, and increasing 
prospects for commercial relations on a more regular basis, the standards 
of honesty improved even without the introduction of fonnal legislation. 
A British report in 1894 on Shiraz stated that Iranian merchants were 
becoming more trustworthy and " ••• the proportion of trade bills returned 
unpaid being certainly not more than the case in any provincial town in 
England ••• " and that " ••. native merchants are less reluctant than formerly 
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to break their contracts and repudiate their engagements ••• 1167 
The expansion of commercial activity enhanced the taxing power of 
the government since the decline in regional self-sufficiency allowed the 
government to extract taxes at points of exchange. Because channels of 
foreign trade were less numerous, it was more easily taxed. Iranian 
merchants also had to pay road taxes and town octrois, but these dues 
yielded much smaller revenue than the customs duties. Especially in the 
first decade of the twentieth century, attempts were made to impose taxes 
on or monopolize the trading of other items of exchange,· like tobacco, 
opium and alcohol, even though a previous effort to establish a tobacco 
regie under a foreign concession in 1890 had backfired on the government. 
Despite a fairly steady growth of the receipts from these diverse areas, 
state income was primarily from land revenue and customs duties, with the 
latter becoming increasingly dominant after the 1890's. Although the 
rate of taxation of foreign trade was not changed until 1903, and even 
then not appreciably, the government was able to collect more because 
the volume of trade was expanding and because its concentration allowed 
68centralized collection. The increase in the taxing capacity, which the 
growing trade permitted, was not at first effectively exploited, at least 
for the benefit of the central government. As late as 1888-1889, out of 
the total receipts of nearly 54.5 Krans, only 8 million Krans were from 
customs revenue. We suspect, however, that both the informal pishkeshes 
(the gift offered to the shah or other high officials at the time of the 
assignment of offices) from the farmers of the customs and their operating 
. . 69 profi ts were rising. Rabino estimates that before the administration 
of customs was centralized, customs revenue was only between two and three 
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percent of the value of foreign trade. 
70 At the time of Shuster's 
mission (1911), this income had risen to over thirty-four million Krans, 
representing about four percent of the value of trade, while the land tax 
revenues had remained practically constant. 
71 The trend continued, and by 
the time Millspaugh took over the financial administration of Iran, customs 
receipts (for the fiscal year 1922-23) had doubled again and now constituted 
over five percent of the foreign trade (excluding oil); land revenue had 
72
risen only about 20 percent. 
Since the customs treaty of 1903 had removed the export levies, the 
trade tax was mainly in the form of an import tariff. In the absence of 
even approximate data on the consumption pattern of the peasantry and 
other sections of the population, it is hard to assess the incidence of 
the taxation, but this modification of the tax structure was probably 
favorable to the peasantry. Some of this advantage was gradually lost 
when various agricultural and livestock products--for instance, opium, 
tobacco, skins, s'laughter of animals--were again taxes or monopolized by 
the state. 
Despite all these developments, there is a tendency to discount their 
direct impact upon the rural areas, for villages and tribes have been 
regarded as essentially stagnant societies, predominantly self-sufficient 
and in little need of trade with other communities. Even recently, 
f Q • IAb raham has ocated tis view. of rura1 areas aJar ran. 
73 Ac-i an a dv h . o 
cording to this position, which is influeced by Marx's comments on Asian 
societies, the extraction of surplus from the rural areas was in kind, and 
the landlord or government official transferred the surplus physically to 
urban areas whence it entered commercial exchange. Consequently, the 
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villagers themselves were not directly engaged in the money economy or in 
commodity exchange with the outside world; within the village, division of 
labor and exchange supposedly was not based upon monetary transactions. 
The fragmentation of the society into many relatively independent units 
74caused the lack of progress. Although at the beginning of the nineteenth 
century, many rural communities in Iran might have fitted this description, 
by the end of the century, the typical village was quite different. There 
are numerous indications that direct monetary exchange became prevalent 
during the course of the century, and that the rural sector was increas­
ingly drawn, through a system of commercial relations, into the wider 
regional and national markets, and, ultimately~ into the international 
economy. 
Examples of monetary sales of agricultural and livestock products 
abound. Such sales often involved direct contact between merchants and 
peasants, though at times purchases were made from landowners not residing 
in villages. Stack, who visited Iran in 1882, reports that Yazdi merchants 
would go as far as Zarand, about a week's journey, to advance money to 
opium growers in return for the purchase of their harvest. He also re­
counts the interest shown by peasants near Isfahan in the prices and trade 
75of opium. Russian and Persian traders encouraged the cultivation of 
American cotton by providing seed and cash to farmers in the North, espe­
cially in Khorasan. They also sent their agents into the countryside to 
procure wool from nomads, sometimes making payments before the herds were 
76clipped. Rabino's description of silk and tobacco growing and trade in 
Ghilan provide further examples of commercialized agriculture. 
77 Despite 
these examples, market transactions were not confined to cash crops like 
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opium, cotton, silk and tobacco. Grains also entered trade, not only for 
domestic consumption but also for exports. Indeed, at the beginning of 
the twentieth century, even without taking smuggling into consideration, 
Iran exported more grains, mainly rice, to Russia than raw cotton. After 
the decline in the silk production in Ghilan, there was a shift to rice 
78and wheat cultivation for Russian markets. Contemporary observers in-
dicate that considerable direct business existed between grain merchants 
and peasants. The British vice consul from Mashad reported in 1896 that 
grain speculators were able to procure wheat cheaply because they did 
not buy in the town, but went to the villages and often made cash advances 
before the harvest. H. L. Rabino noted a government prohibition, imposed 
to combat hoarding, which forbade produce merchants' (allafs) going to the 
79rural areas of Rasht to purchase rice. 
Like the settled rural population, nomadic tribes engaged in commer­
cial activity. They found a ready market for their livestock products, es­
pecially butter, wool and hides, and, to some extent, for live animals. 
The expansion of the rug weaving industry in the last decades of the nine­
teenth century increased the market for their wool and, of course, the 
tribes themselves wove and sold their rugs and gilims. Because of their 
migratory way of life, nomads probably had infrequent contact with commer­
cial centers and marketed their produce when they passed near such towns 
during the course of their migration. For instance, Boroojen, in the 
vicinity of Isphahan, is reported by Al-Isphahani to have been a trading 
center for the Turkish and Lur tribes. Mirza Hossain Khan, in his book, 
Jughaphiaye Isphahan, mentions that many tribes came during summer months. 
to the neighbourhood of Isphahan and traded in the city and villages 
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" ••• bringing sheep and taking back cash, cloth and other goods. 1180 
The extent of the spread of markets into rural areas is also demon­
strated by the responsiveness of peasants and landlords to economic incen­
tives. This sensitivity to market forces is reflected not only in long­
term rise or decline of various crops but also in shorter term shifts 
between crops. The much-discussed expansion of opium trade was clearly 
due to economic factors; indeed, the government sometimes had to legislate 
against increases in opium production. Zil-01-Sultan, for instance, ordered 
that one acre of wheat be grown for every four acres of opium; at times, 
81planting of certain crops was pranoted through tax exemptions. The 
rise in cotton production and exports in response to the price increases 
during the American Civil War, and the temporary decline before the rapid 
expansion towards the end of the nineteenth century are well-documented 
instances of market influence. Dickson, the secretary to the British 
Legation, reported in 1865, that the export of cotton from Southern Persia 
had increased five fold since 1862-1863. In 1873 a British report esti­
mated the rise of cotton exports from Southern Iranian ports during the 
American Civil War, " ••• from next to nothing to 100,000 bales annually ••. ", 
while at the time of the report, export of cotton had practically ceased. 
Although much smaller in magnitude, the same process appears to have been 
repeated in Azerbayejan where cotton production expanded rapidly during 
the War when prices increased sev~ral fold, but dropped after 1866 when 
foreign prices declined and difficulties were experienced in marketing 
82the cotton. Less spectacula~ but just as indicative of responses to 
economic forces, are cases of expansion of minor crops in specific regions 
such as the cultivation of tobacco in Ghilan, where cigarette tobacco was 
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introduced in the mid 1870's. In 1877 about 43 thousand kilograms were 
harvested, and by 1891 the output had grown to over 450,000 kilograms--an 
increase of over ten-fold. After this date, cultivation of tobacco continued 
83 
to grow but at a slower pace and fluctuated according to market price. 
Contemporary observers were well aware of the relevance of profitability 
in farmers' decisions to grow particular crops. In 1891, a British consular 
report for Mashad stated that "The people of Turbat-i-Haidari also have begun 
to cultivate saffron, as they find it more remunerative than cotton." A 
later report from the same area recorded, " ••• two or three years ago opium 
had become so cheap that it hardly paid the cultivators, and that in con­
seuqence the area cultivated began to diminish. but, now the merchants have 
begun to buy up the drug ••. l'he recultivation has begun with renewed energy." 
Al-Isphahan, himself a merchant, observed in the 1880's, how the amount of 
cotton produced in the vicinity of Isphahan varied each year depending on 
its price. He also attributed the decline in the cultivation of tobacco to 
the import tariff imposed on it in the Ottoman Empire, the chief market for 
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Iranian tobacco. Clearly, the examples in the last two paragraphs demon-
strate that the connnonly accepted views of the conservative, self-sufficient 
peasant that prevails to this day had no foundation in facts. 
The rise of commercial agriculture is also indicated by the increase 
in pre-harvest sales of crops, either bv peasants or landlords. We have 
already refered to merchants making cash advances. Arrangements for such 
loans were diverse and complicated, though they often involved debtors 
pledging to sell produce to a creditor at a fixed price or at the prevailing 
market price at harvest time. In other cases, the crop was used as a 
security on the loan, and the debtor could simply pay back the loan together 
-41-
. 85 
wti h t h e accrued interest. The implicit or explicit rate of interest on 
such cash advances was at times, usurious, hut such loans differed in nature 
from the usury to which the peasantry was often subjected. 
86 Firstlv, such 
credit arrangements were not necessarily between the landlords and peasants, 
though the former did occasionallv act as intermediaries. Instead,thev 
were the beginnings of more competitive and impersonal capital markets. 
Secondly, landlords as well as peasants were recipients of the cash advances. 
Thirdly, the willingness of merchants to make these credits available on the 
security of the crops indicated the marketability of agricultural products. 
Traders were, presumably, more iwlling to make advances on crops whose prices 
were relatively stable, like cotton and opium. Finally, pre-harvest sales on 
the part of the farmers reflected their need for cash. Such funds were used 
in a variety of ways depending on who obtained them, but even if the poorer 
ex­peasants spent the money on food such purchase would indicate monetary 
change in the rural areas. 
A neglected aspect of expansion of market exchange into rural areas is 
the change in the cahracter of rural handicrafts. Some of the non-food re­
quirements of the rural population were, surelv, produced locally. Whether 
or not such handicraft production declined in the villages, as it did in 
the towns, is difficult to estahlish--quite possiblv, it did. An excentional 
womendevelopment was the growth of rug weaving, much of which was done by 
and children in villages. The rise of this "cottage industrv" after the mid-
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nineteenth centurv is well known. For the rural areas, expansion of rug 
weaving meant changing the orientation of handicraft activities from meeting 
local needs to producin?- for markets. Besides rugs, other rural crafts were 
sometimes undertaken for sale in the towns. Writing about Isphahan, the 
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British Consul reported in 1892 that "The women in the village [Haft Taher1 
were all employed in making P,ivas [a native Iranian cloth shoe] .•. These 
givas are taken to Yazd and Isphahan for sale, during harvest time, some 15 
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pairs are made daily, in winter about 25 pairs~ 
Provision of wage labor is another facet of the integration of the rural 
population into the national economy. Historically, large-scale migration, 
primarily motivated by political and military factors, had been fairly common 
in Iran. The distinguishing characteristic of the population movement in 
the late nineteenth or early twentieth century is its responsiveness to 
economic factors. Many references can be found to short-term movements of 
peasants, either to the cities to take up non-agricultural jobs (mainly 
in construction) or to other rural areas to seek agricultural employment. 
In some villages, outside casual laborers provided wage labor, usually at 
were paid in cash or kind. Estimates of H.L. Rabino in­harvest time, and # 
dicate that each year more than 25 thousand Khalkhali peasants went to Rasht 
to work during the fall and winter but returned to Khalkhal for the beginning 
of their own agricultural season. He also reported that the [lazy] Guilak 
peasant would employ a mozdour (paid laborer) whenever he could afford it.
89 
The road projects undertaken between 1890 and 1920 offered many employment 
opportunities. For instance, 30 thousand laborers were employed by the 
- -90 
British in 1920 to keep the Kerm~nshah-Teheran road clear. 
An increasingly important component of the wage labor force was the 
Iranian migratory worker who went to Russia to be employed in factories or 
to haveto build railroads. The magnitude of such movements, which appear 
been short-term migrations rather than permanent emigration, are indeed 
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striking. Entner estimates that in the first decade of the present century 
between 60 thousand and 100 thousand Iranians annually entered Russia and 
about an equal number returned. During the years immediately preceding 
91the War, these numbers had more than doubled. 
In addition to these direct indications of the extension of commercial 
relations into rural areas, we can point to other manifestations of an en­
larged sphere of market exchange. The money obtained from the sale of 
products had to be spent; the pattern of its expenditure is relevant to 
our argument. Some of the proceeds went for in taxes either by the landlords 
or the peasants, but the magnitude of sales of agriculture products for the 
domestic markets and for exports far exceeded the tax revenue of the govern­
ment. A large share of the money was probably left in the hands of landlords 
and merchants, but some must have remained with the peasants to he spent by 
them on consumer goods. Unfortunately, we have little direct information 
on the consumption habits or living standards of the peasantry, yet indirect 
evidence suggests that at least some consumed beyond the bare minimum of 
food and clothing and that part of the goods they consumed was purchased. 
The main items of consumption were tea, sugar and cotton cloth, and the data 
on the imports of such products indicate that their use must have been wide­
spread, not merely confined to the urban areas. During the first decade of 
this century, sugar imports into Iran ranged between 75 thousand and 120 
thousand tons annually, which implies a per capita consumption of between 
7.4 kilograms and 12 kilograms, approximately equal to the rate of consumption 
in Grate Britain in the 1840's. Since the urban population was only about 
2 million, it appears unlikely that the entire amount was consumed in the 
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cities, especially when we note that the vast majority of the city dwellers 
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were not much better off than the peasantry. The same argument can be 
repeated for cotton cloth and tea. Consumption of such items was apparently 
common among the majority of the peasantry. A British Consul connnenting on 
the poverty of Sistan, impli~d the prevalence of such purchases in the more 
prosperous areas, when he observed, "The people are so wretchedlv poor that 
there is no demand for these things. They make their own cloths and don't 
119 3drink tea. 
In many villages, there were shops which catered to the needs of the 
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people and permanent traders acted as buying agents for city merchants. 
In the more thickly populated Caspian region, regular weekly markets were 
held where peasants could sell their produce and purchase consumer goods, 
while in other regions, itinerant merchants (Pilevars) took such products as 
tea, sugar and cloth to villages and tribal areas. Some of these sales were 
for cash, but part of the trading appears to have been barter where no monev 
changed hands, the traders providing credit to be repaid in produce after 
the harvest. Yet, even the barter deals essentially involved commodity ex­
change in the Marxian sense. The villagers and tribesmen went into towns to 
buy and sell goods. Al-Isphahani mentions a bazaar in Ishpahan called 
Najafabadi since the inhabitants of this region brought their khoshkebar 
(dried furits and nuts) there to sell. Mirza Hossain Khan describes the guild 
of the sellers of ready-made clothes in Isphahan, whose chief customers 
95 were the tribe. (Incidentally, a major expenditure item for tribes was 
probably arms and ammunition which they bought in the cities). 
The underestimation of the extent of market participation by the rural 
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population is perhaps partly due to the tendency to regard the rural social 
structure as homogeneous and to make a sharp demarcation between landlords 
and peasants. In fact, the situation was more complex. In certain areas, 
there were small holders, usually better off than tenants, and even on the 
estates of large landlords, the internal social structure was hierarchical. 
Representative of landlords and certain village officials enjoved special 
privileges. Some villagers were more prosperous than others by virtue of 
owning draught animals; at the bottom of the scale were landless laborers, 
distinguished from share-croppers. The existence of social differentiation 
within villages and between regions implied differences in consumption 
patterns. The more prosperous elements, whose living standards still left 
much to be desired, consumed other goods besides grain and homespun cloth. 
Increased availability of Western products probablv first enticed this section 
of the population to produce for the market and to look outside the villap,e 
for the satisfaction of their wants. To the extent that the decline in the 
economic and political autonomy of villages produced a more hierarchical 
structure, as we may conjecture, the process of commercialization would have 
been accelerated. 
A consequence of the increased commercialization of agriculture was the 
growth of investment in land by the merchant class. Apart from the social 
prestige of land ownership, several economic reasons explained the heightened 
interest shown by merchants in acquiring landed property. Firstlv, the 
orientation of agriculture to cash crops, made land a more attractive 
commercial asset; outsiders like merchants, were better able to assess its 
value, and the risk of owning land was reduced because access to international 
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trade meant less volatile markets. Both these factors provided merchants 
with more opportunities for diversification of their assets, for the relative 
attractiveness of land as an investment had been enhanced. Secondly, during 
the reign of both Nasir-al .-Din Shah and his successor, the state began to 
sell its khaliseh land (stat-e domain) and, presumably, merchants with liquid 
96funds managed to purchase some of these properties at bargain prices. 
Thirdly, the acquisition of land by merchants was, in part, involuntary. The 
extravagant lifestyle of the large landlords and the "nobilitv" with their 
newly acquired tastes and habits required cash outlays which they could not 
97always make. Even though they possessed considerable assets, they often 
faced liquidity problems and had to turn to merchants to borrow. Land was 
usually put up as collateral for such loans and in the cases where they 
could not pay their debts their land would pass into the hands ,of the merchant 
class. Despite these developments favoring acquisition of land by this 
group, with few exceptions, merchants did not join the ranks of the large 
landlords until after the period under consideration here. They tended to 
acquire villages near their place of residence not only because control was 
easier but also because their location near towns guaranteed ready access 
to markets. At times, such properties also served the dual function of pro­
viding summer homes. Merchants like Amin-0-Zarb, who had large holdings, 
usually consolidated these in particular regions. It is safe to conclude 
that although land was becoming more of a "commodity" itself, the difficulties 
98of communication still made its market limited. 
In describing the transformation of the rural sector, we have neglected 
the changes that occurred in urban areas. In fact, they were closely related 
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and the modifications in the nature of the urban economy mirrored the de­
velopments of the rural sector. The structure that emerged was the natural 
consequence of an externally imposed change. We have already provided 
support for such an assertion in our discussion of Russo-Persian trade and 
Iran's commercial relations with other industrial nations were similar. 
These dependent and unequal relationships had created a lop-sided structure 
within cities which, gradually deprived of their own industry, became centers 
of bureaucracy and trade where merchants acted as intermediaries between the 
rural sector and the international economy. The competition from Western 
goods had undermined handicrafts, although certain artisans tried to imitate 
Western production, without large scale output and introduction of machinery, 
such attempts were futile. The expansion of the carpet industry was no sub­
stitute for the wide range of manufacturing that was partly eliminated. Both 
this industry and others catering to the West, such as shawl weaving in 
Kerman, were not suitable for capitalist expansion. Attempts to mechanize 
would have destroyed the raison dretre of these industries. 
III 
From our brief descriptions and analysis of the structural changes that 
occurred in Iran a reasonably clear picture emerges. By the first decade 
of the present century, we can no longer characterize Iranian agriculture 
as subsistence farming. By then, it was well integrated into the national 
economy and commercial relations were widespread. Many features of subsistence 
farming persisted: rents in kind were still prevalent; the landlord-peasant 
relationship did not become simply one of employer to employee, and many non-
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market considerations continued to bind them to one another; large nHmhers 
of peasants had little or no marketable surplus. These characteristics 
of the rural economy remained largelv unchanged even after 1921, for in the 
years between the World Wars the government concentrated its efforts on 
industrialization. But the direction of change was unmistakeable. Increased 
conunercialization and regional specialization had alreadv laid the foundation 
for the introduction of cash rents and wages. The expansion of the market 
system had naturally produced unequal development and magnified income and 
wealth inequalities both within and among regions. Most significantly, larr,er 
volumes of external and internal commercial interchange had shifted the basis 
of the fiscal system, permitting greater political and economic integration 
of the countrv. 
These developments came to a virtual halt during the decade 1910-1920 
as political and military events within Iran and outside its horders disrupted 
commerce, hut this slow-down was quickly reversed once normal conditions 
were restored. The reforms that the government instituted after the coup 
basically involved the political unification of the country throuP,h the 
establishment of a strong central government. The prerequisite for the 
centralization of authority was the command over economic resources to maintain 
a bureaucracy and an army. The gradual economic changes of the 60 vears 
preceding the coup, bv creating a fairly integrated national economv, nrovided 
the government with the basis to easilv acquire the financial power. As 
we mentioned previously increased exchange enhanced the fiscal capacitv of 
the government and permitted geographical separation of political and economic 
power from productive activity. A large surplus could be extracted and snent 
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wherever desired, whatever its place of origin. When the government 
attempted to reform the· fiscal system after the coup,scant attention was 
paid to obtaining larger revenues from the land. Instead the government 
concentrated on taxing items that entered national or international market 
exchange. Budget estimates for.1926-1927 indicate that revenue from these 
sources constituted about 80 percent of government receipts (excluding 
revenue from the oil concessions, which were just beginning to expand). 
By then, the volume of internal and external trade was large enough that, 
even without an unduely high rate of taxation, government finances could 
be placed on a relatively sound footing. The developments that occurred 
during the reign of Raza Shah further integrated the national economy, in­
creasing internal exchange and reducing the dependence of agricultural 
exports of certain regions on particular markets. Government reforms and 
programs were certainly responsible for the greater economic and political 
unification of the country, but conditions for their effectiveness had been 
initiated by the gradual economic transformations that had been taking place 
prior to their institution. 
APPENDIX ON SOURCES 
This short appendix is not intended as a bibliographical essay on the 
•
writings and primary source material on nineteenth century Iranian economic 
history. Its purpose is rather to point out the principal deficiencies in 
the source materials used by most students of the subject, ourselves not 
excluded, and to explain why there still remain substantial areas for dis­
agreement among historians of the period. 
Primary sources in the Western languages consist mainly of foreign 
travellers' accounts of Iran, memoirs of Western "experts" and envoys 
residing in Iran over fairly extended periods of time and, perhaps most 
importantly, regular consular reports and diplomatic correspondence. Over 
the course of the century, as contacts became more numerous, the amount of 
such material increased. Recourse to many of these sources entails recog~ 
nizing certain inherent biases. Firstly, many of the recorded observations 
do not provide independent information since writers frequently drew upon 
material from their predecessors. Secondly, as we have already mentioned 
in our text, the economic and political developments of the West must have 
gradually changed the vantage point of Western observers of Iran. Thirdly, 
one naturally finds excessive concern with foreign trade; consular staffs 
were especially preoccupied with the re_lative competitiveness of their 
own national goods with other foreign merchandise. In this context, it 
is not surprising that the internal economic affairs of Iran, except insofar 
as they touch upon external trade, received scant attention. 
Persian primary sources which remain undestroyed are as yet.rela­
tively unexplored. Much of what is still available is scattered and 
ordinarily not easily accessible to scholars. A notable exception is the 
collection of the papers of Haji-Amin-O-Zarb which promises an unequalled 
-51-
record of the economic and social history of Iran during the last three 
decades of the century. Personal diaries and memoirs, whose publication 
has expanded recently, are generally more relevant to the political his­
tory of the country. Many secondary sources exist in Persian, and of 
these the most useful to economic analysts are the histories of particular 
regions or cities rather than the general history books. Much of the in­
formation contained in such works tends to be unsystematic, non-quantitative 
and without reference to the source, all of which diminish their value. 
In addition to the paucity of data, the problems of economic historians 
of Iran are compounded by the conflicting information obtained from various 
sources. Some of the contradictions may be explained by the diversity in 
the condition of the different regions. They do, however, also reflect 
the biases of the writers and the simple misinformation provided to the 
foreigners by their informants, for language difficulties often added to 
the hazards of gathering information. Another possible explanation of 
the differences is the periodic occurrence of natural disasters causing 
short-term fluctuations in the conditions of the country. To contemporary 
observers not very familiar with Iran, immediate situations might have 
been mistaken for longer term states of affairs. 
The relatively undeveloped state of the economic history of Iran can 
be explained mainly by the difficulties in obtaining reliable and systematic 
data. Before attempts can be made to write a general economic history, 
more detailed research has to be done not only on histories of the different 
regions of Iran but also on specific economic sectors and industries. In 
the absence of such work, valid generalization will be rare, and there will 
be ample ground for genuine differences which do not merely reflect the 
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ideological biases of the writers. The conclusions of this paper are no 
exception to the caveat; they are not meant to be taken as established 
truth but as suggestive hypotheses. 
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